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Interpreting International Human Rights Standards – Treaty Body 
General Comments in Domestic Courts 
 
Kasey McCall-Smith* 
 
Abstract: This paper explores the introduction of treaty body jurisprudence into domestic 
legal systems. Specifically it will consider the use of general comments by human rights 
treaty bodies. The contribution will begin with a brief introduction of the treaty bodies, as it 
is the nature of these bodies that warrants consideration of their jurisprudence as a legitimate 
interpretive tool. It will then present an overview of references to treaty body general 
comments in the case law across a selection of jurisdictions, including the UK and South 
Africa, as well as the EU as a supranational jurisdiction. Finally, it will analyse the impact 
that these domestic engagements with treaty body jurisprudence has on the interpretation of 
international human rights standards. It will consider whether the outcome of a court case that 
has relied upon general comments contributes to or detracts from the strength of the treaty 
body outputs. It is posited that in instances where rights are progressively recognised for 
protection, general comments serve as a chisel to aid in refining rights. In instances where the 
judiciary disregards or distorts treaty body guidance, it is suggested that the general 
comments act more as a hammer that weakens a particular right. Thus it is extremely 
important that treaty bodies take special care when drafting their opinions, comments and 
reports therefore some attention will be given to the issue of treaty body drafting.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
Human rights treaties are standard-setting, yet these standards are open-textured and 
evolutionary. Therefore interpretive tools must be engaged in order to flesh out the true 
extent of states’ obligations, particularly as these obligations evolve to reflect rights in the 
modern world. The human rights treaty bodies embedded in each of the UN human rights 
treaties are comprised of experts in the field specific to each treaty and represent a unique 
feature of the core treaties in that they are the primary interpreters of the treaties at the 
international level. Human rights treaty bodies have contributed a great deal to the 
development of measurable international human rights obligations. Through the functions 
confirmed by their respective treaties, treaty bodies have a range of options by way of which 
they can inform States Parties about the evolving nature of human rights protection. From 
issuing general comments, to appraising states’ periodic reports, or reaching final views on 
individual communications – what will be referred to collectively throughout this chapter as 
‘jurisprudence’ – there is no lack of soft law to be found. Though many states often ignore 
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treaty body jurisprudence, there is unmistakeable evidence that it is creeping into the 
domestic realm by virtue of increasing reference in domestic court opinions and policy 
debates. The persisting question is whether the use of treaty body jurisprudence at the 
domestic level refines or distorts the development of universal human rights standards.  
Human rights treaty bodies are invested by their respective treaties with the 
competence to assess the implementation of the obligations. As will be examined below, the 
various methods by which treaty bodies may engage in this assessment is outlined in each 
treaty and the competences of each supervisory mechanism varies, albeit only slightly. The 
jurisprudence produced through the exercise of these competencies is a form of soft law that 
can respond to the legal and social environment more flexibly and guide interpretation and 
state practice in the international sphere. In other words, the soft law produced by the treaty 
bodies is norm-filling.1 However, it is when these soft instruments are introduced into 
domestic legal systems that they are truly tested, especially when the instruments are used in 
a peculiar manner.2 The impact of these references sustains the concept of soft law that treaty 
body instruments contain rules which are in the process of incubation. The judicial practices 
surveyed herein suggest that these incubating rules – or more accurately, interpretations of 
the minimalist binding rules found in the treaties themselves – are gaining traction. It also 
supports the oft-repeated maxims that human rights treaties do not exist in a vacuum3 and are 
‘living instruments’4 which makes evolutionary interpretation necessary.  
This paper explores the introduction of treaty body jurisprudence into domestic legal 
systems. Specifically it will consider the use of general comments.5 The contribution will 
begin with a brief introduction of the treaty bodies, as it is the nature of these bodies that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 T. Gammeltoft-Hansen, S. Lagoutte and John C., ‘Introduction: Tracing the Roles of Soft Law in Human 
Rights’, not yet published - copy on file. 
2 The same observation can be said of domestic court application of treaty interpretation rules generally. See, 
e.g. H.P. Aust, A. Rodiles and P. Staubach, ‘Unity or Uniformity? Domestic Courts and Treaty Interpretation’ 
(2014) 27 Leiden Journal of International Law 75-112, 84. 
3 For example, F. Hampson, Working paper submitted pursuant to Sub-Commission decision 1998/113, UN 
Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1999/28 (1999) (1999 Working paper), para. 13.  
4 A. Boyle and C. Chinkin, The Making of International Law (Oxford University Press, 2007) 155. 
5 Throughout this chapter the term ‘general comments’ will be used collectively in reference to both general 
comments and general recommendations as in practice both terms refer to the same form of treaty body 
jurisprudential product. See for example, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), 999 
UNTS 171, 16 Dec. 1966, Art. 40(4): ‘The Committee shall study the reports submitted by the States Parties to 
the present Covenant. It shall transmit its reports, and such general comments as it may consider appropriate, to 
States Parties’ (emphasis added). The Convention on the Elimination of All forms of Discrimination against 
Women (CEDAW) 1249 UNTS 13, 18 Dec. 1979, Art. 21(1): ‘The Committee shall…report annually to the 
General Assembly of the United Nations on its activities and may make suggestions and general 
recommendations based on the examination of reports and information received from the States Parties’ 
(emphasis added). Similar statements can be found in each of the core UN human rights treaties discussed in 
this paper. 
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warrants consideration of their jurisprudence as a legitimate interpretive tool. It will then 
present an overview of references to treaty body general comments in the case law across a 
selection of jurisdictions, including the UK and South Africa, as well as the EU as a 
supranational jurisdiction. Finally, it will analyse the impact that these domestic engagements 
with treaty body jurisprudence has on the interpretation of international human rights 
standards. It will consider whether the outcome of a court case that has relied upon general 
comments contributes to or detracts from the strength of the treaty body outputs. It is posited 
that in instances where rights are progressively recognised for protection, general comments 
serve as a chisel to aid in refining rights. In instances where the judiciary disregards or 
distorts treaty body guidance, it is suggested that the general comments act more as a hammer 
that weakens a particular right. Thus it is extremely important that treaty bodies take special 
care when drafting their opinions, comments and reports therefore some attention will be 
given to the issue of treaty body drafting.  
As an interpretive tool, treaty body general comments enrich the understanding of 
human rights obligations and it is clear that state organs are increasingly willing to entertain 
these views in order to better define human rights at the domestic level. As an increasingly 
authoritative form of soft law, general comments are shaping the way in which domestic 
courts interpret international human rights standards. What is not clear is whether these 
standards are bolstered or undermined by the unwieldy nature of domestic interpretations. 
 
2. Human Rights Treaty Bodies 
Human rights treaty bodies are the embedded international institutions of the UN human 
rights treaties and the primary enforcement mechanisms of the texts’ obligations. All of the 
treaty bodies review periodic reports and are authorised to issue general comments6 as they 
may consider appropriate. Essential to the perceived legal value of the opinion documents of 
the treaty bodies is the independent, expert, non-political status of the bodies.  
Each of the treaty bodies’ membership election processes are crafted to guarantee that 
an unbiased authority exercises oversight over the universal human rights treaties. The treaty 
body election guidelines seek to achieve equitable geographical distribution in addition to 
representation of different types of civilisations and legal systems among the States Parties, 
which helps ensure that no one region or culture dominates. Essential to the execution of their 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
6 Ibid. 
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duties is the requirement that members act in their personal capacities, not as representatives 
of their governments despite being nominated by them.  
It has been suggested that experts working together in the international context ‘can 
facilitate the resolution of global policy issues by narrowing the range within which political 
bargains could be struck.’7 For example, typical members of the CEDAW Committee have 
been active in the areas of gender equality and women’s issues and this is reflected by their 
curriculum vitae. Picciotto observed that ‘delegating specific issues to specialists who would 
deal with them in a depoliticized fashion…is a means of implementing policies that have 
been formulated through political processes…[and] understood as a response to the problems 
of governing ever more complex societies.’8  The treaty bodies exist to ensure specific rights 
are implemented into a variety of social, cultural and political jurisdictions. The combination 
of a highly varied membership and specialists in the field, both mandated by committee 
election guidelines, provides an essential element of legitimacy to the work of the treaty 
bodies.  Without the treaty bodies supervising implementation, human rights treaties would 
be in danger of becoming merely aspirational. 
 
3. Treaty Body Jurisprudence  
States Parties have a duty of good faith to cooperate with the treaty body as recognised by 
general principles of treaty law.9 It is essential that treaty bodies interpret the obligations in 
light of the domestic situation on the ground, including introduction of new law or 
reconciliation with existing law. The interaction between a treaty body and a State Party is 
very much an exclusive, interactive process and is best understood as an on-going dialogue. 
Thus, treaty bodies function primarily on a bilateral plane.10 The exception to this rule is the 
practice of issuing general comments or recommendations, which are specifically intended to 
provide useful information to all States Parties regarding how convention obligations should 
be implemented.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7 S. Picciotto, ‘Constitutionalizing Multilevel Governance?’ (2008) 6 International Journal of Constitutional 
Review 457-479, 459. 
8 Ibid. 
9 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (Vienna Convention), 1155 UNTS 331, 23 May 1969, Art. 26. This 
is also typically noted within each of the treaty texts. 
10 N. Rodley, ‘United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies and Special Procedures of the Commission on 
Human Rights: Complementary or Competition?’ (2003) 25 Human Rights Quarterly 882-908, 887. 
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General comments are often viewed as the ‘attendant product’ to guide states on the 
scope of treaty obligations.11 In light of the concerns of many states about interference with 
state sovereignty, the treaty bodies’ obligations to make general comments is possibly the 
strongest language available to indicate that they are singularly responsible for guiding states’ 
compliance with a treaty despite the fact that this practice has often been harpooned by states 
as an over-extension of their powers.12 General comments address the entirety of States 
Parties, rather than individual states as with the communications or periodic reporting 
procedures, and they range from mundane matters of internal treaty body functioning to 
elucidating the appropriate means of protecting particular rights.13  
 
3.1 General comments - evolving practice 
The practice of issuing general comments began in 1981 with the Human Rights Committee 
pursuant to ICCPR Article 40.14 Eight of the nine core UN human rights treaty bodies have 
issued a combined 145 general comments on various aspects of their respective treaties.15 
These include the CERD Committee16 (35 comments), the Human Rights Committee 
(HRC)17 (35 comments), the ESCR Committee18 (21 comments), the CEDAW Committee19 
(30 comments), the CAT Committee20 (3 comments), the CRC Committee21 (17 comments), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Ibid., 906. 
12 See, for example, Observations by the United States of America and the United Kingdom on General 
Comment No. 24(52), UN Doc. A/50/40 (1995); reprinted in (1995) 16 Human Rights Law Journal 423. 
13 See Rodley (n10) 888; H.J. Steiner, ‘Individual Claims in a World of Massive Violations: What Role for the 
Human Rights Committee?’, in P. Alston and J. Crawford (eds), The Future of UN Human Rights Treaty 
Monitoring (Cambridge University Press, 2000) 22. 
14 For a more complete overview of the history of general comments see H. Keller and L. Grover, ‘General 
Comments of the Human Rights Committee and their Legitimacy’, in H. Keller and G. Ulfstein (eds), UN 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies: Law and Legitimacy (Cambridge University Press, 2012) 121-127; P. Alston, 
‘The Historical Origins of the Concept of ‘General Comments’ in Human Rights Law’ in L. Boisson de 
Chazournes and V. Gowlland-Debbas (eds), The International Legal System in Quest of Equity and 
Universality:  Liber Amicorum Georges Abi-saab (2001) 763, reprinted in H. J. Steiner, P.  Alston and R. 
Goodman, International Human Rights in Context: Law, Politics, Morals (3rd edn: Oxford University Press, 
2008) 873 et seq. 
15 As of 20 November 2014.  
16 The treaty body established by Art. 8 of the Convention on the Elimination of all forms of Racial 
Discrimination (CERD), 669 UNTS 195, 21 Dec. 1965. 
17 The treaty body established by Art. 28, ICCPR. 
18 The treaty body overseeing the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), 
993 UNTS 3, 26 Dec. 1966, was established by ECOSOC Resolution 1985/17, 28 May 1985. Prior to the 
resolution, reports were submitted directly to the UN Economic and Social Council pursuant to Article 16 of the 
Covenant. 
19 The treaty body established by Art. 18 of CEDAW. 
20 The treaty body established by Art. 17 of the Convention on the Prevention of Torture and Other Cruel, 
Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CAT), 465 UNTS 85, 10 Dec. 1984. 
21 The treaty body established by Art. 43 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 1577 UNTS 3, 20 
Nov. 1989. 
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the Committee on Migrant Workers22 (2 comments), and the newest treaty body to 
commence operation, the Committee on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (2 
comments). The most recent general comment was adopted in October 2014 by the HRC on 
the right to liberty and security of person.23  
The debate amongst observers of the UN human rights regime assigns disparate levels 
of importance to these comments as a form of soft law. Some view them as authoritative 
interpretations of the treaties while others view them as unsystematic and unfounded 
statements deserving no recognition in the law.24 Though there is far from consensus on the 
determination of exactly what legal weight general comments carry, it is evident that they 
have influenced the protection of human rights and the enrichment of the human rights 
dialogue. 
 
3.2 Guiding principles on general comments 
The guiding principles on formulating comments, an amalgamation of the procedure and 
practice that has developed since 1981, indicate that they should be directed to States Parties, 
promote co-operation between States Parties, summarise the experience the committee has 
gained reviewing the States Parties’ periodic reports and focus the attention of the States 
Parties on matters that would improve implementation of the treaty obligations.25 They are 
intended to provide ‘significant normative guidance’ on aspects of implementation of the 
treaty.26 Furthermore, the subjects should be limited to those involving implementation of 
obligations related to periodic reports, guarantee of the treaty rights, article specific questions 
or suggestions relating to cooperation between States Parties.27 General comments are most 
often expository in style and the language typically reflects the expertise of the treaty body in 
dealing with the treaty obligations under its supervision.28 In maintaining a formula, albeit a 
vague one, it is intended that comments adhering to the guidelines will be more widely 
accepted by states.   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
22 The treaty body established by Art. 72 of the Convention for the Protection of the Rights of Migrant Workers 
and Their Families (CRMW), 2220 UNTS 3, 18 Dec. 1990. 
23 HRC, General Recommendation No 35: Article 9: Liberty and Security of person, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/35 
(2014), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f35&
Lang=en (last accessed 1 December 2014).  
24 See Keller and Grover (n14) 118-19.  
25 See Alston (n14) 876. 
26 Keller and Grover (n14) 124. 
27 Alston (n14) 876. 
28 See, for example, Rodley (n10) 888-89, discussing the HRC’s general comment on ICCPR Art. 7. 
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The lack of a clear definition of ‘general comment/recommendation’ in the treaties 
coupled with the vague guidelines outlines has resulted in diverse subject matters ranging 
from implementation of CERD Article 629 to the practice of reservations to the ICCPR30 and 
CEDAW31. What is important to reiterate is that the treaty bodies are carrying out their duties 
under the treaty texts. The issue of transmitting comments, as with many aspects in the 
human rights regime, was intentionally left undefined so that practices could develop as the 
human rights movement spread. However, it is now clear that the practice is firmly 
established and accepted by the majority of States Parties.32  
 
3.3 General Comments – points of contention 
The issuing of general comments has traditionally been the point at which states articulate 
opposition to treaty bodies as they often view the practice as going beyond the treaty into the 
realm of developing new law.33 States that are reluctant to have their implementation 
programmes checked by a non-domestic entity are a throw-back to the world when it was 
smaller and human rights were not such an international concern. General comments air the 
problems that surface during the review of periodic reports and though they are not state-
specific, the fact that reports and comments are publicly available lends to the easy 
association of themes and, therefore, may be embarrassing to states with less than 
commendable rights records. This, in turn, causes offended States Parties to argue the lack of 
legal basis for the comment. Alston appropriately identified general comments as a ‘double-
edged sword’ for States Parties who launch attacks criticising their legitimacy as it not only 
draws attention to their disagreement with the opinion and authority of the commenting 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 See CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 26:  Article 6 of the Convention, UN Doc. A/55/18, 
annex V (2000), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCERD%2fGEC%2f7
498&Lang=en (last accessed 21 November 2014). 
30 See HRC, General Comment No. 24:  Issues relating to reservations made upon ratification or accession to 
the Covenant or the Optional Protocols thereto, or in relation to declarations under article 41 of the Covenant, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.6, 04 Nov.1994, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1
%2fAdd.6&Lang=en (last accessed 21 November 2014). 
31 See CEDAW Committee, General Recommendation No 4: Reservations, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9, vol. II 
(2008), http://www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/recommendations/recomm.htm#recom4 (last accessed 18 
November 2014). 
32 G. Ulfstein, ‘Law-making by Human Rights Treaty Bodies’ in R. Liivoja and J. Petman (eds), International 
Law-Making: Essays in Honour of Jan Klabbers (Routledge, 2014) 252.  
33 Keller and Grover (n14) 118. 
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committee, but also highlights the committee’s interpretation of the controversial right, thus 
establishing a benchmark for other States Parties.34  
Much of the opinion surrounding general comments has turned on the drafting and the 
process by which the comment is adopted;35 comments specifically derived from treaty 
documents have met far less criticism than those that are more creative with the execution of 
a treaty body’s remit. Examples of both can be found in the 2008 General Comment 3336 of 
the HRC, which deals with States Parties’ obligations pursuant to the Optional Protocol37 to 
the ICCPR (OP-ICCPR). The HRC notes that under Article 2 of the OP-ICCPR that a State 
Party is obliged to provide the author of a complaint with an effective remedy when an 
ICCPR violation is determined by the Committee. By grounding their statement in the treaty 
text, States Parties are reminded of the obligations to which they have agreed in becoming a 
party to the Covenant. Paragraph 19, by contrast, refers to the HRC’s rules of procedure as a 
basis for implementing interim measures where it is thought that irreparable harm is likely to 
occur before the Committee is able to develop its final views on the complaint. Though 
linked back to its purpose under the OP-ICCPR and obviously an important tool, using the 
rules of procedure as a basis for obliging a state to comply with a Committee decision is far 
weaker than using the actual obligation to which the state has subscribed.    
 
3.4 Summary 
A mounting hazard for states, which is equally a windfall for human rights protection, is that 
treaty body jurisprudence is often viewed as a form of developing law and is increasingly 
been cited by domestic courts and regional human rights organs, thus incorporating them into 
the corpus of case law and moving them to a less ‘soft’ form of law, particularly in common 
law jurisdictions. This use of treaty body jurisprudence may be more appropriately referred to 
as ‘liquid’ law in the domestic context as it aids in filling the gaps in rights assessment. In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Alston (n14) 763, and 874 of reprinted version. 
35 Keller and Grover (n14) 119. 
36 HRC, General Comment No 33:  The Obligations of States Parties under the Optional Protocol to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/33 (2008), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/Treaties/CCPR/Shared%20Documents/1_Global/CCPR_C_GC_33_4746_E.pdf (last 
accessed 20 November 2014). 
37 HRC General Comment 34 notes at paragraph 3: ‘The preamble to the Optional Protocol states that its 
purpose is “further to achieve the purposes” of the Covenant by enabling the Human Rights Committee, 
established in part IV of the Covenant, “to receive and consider, as provided in the present Protocol, 
communications from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set forth in the 
Covenant.” The Optional Protocol sets out a procedure, and imposes obligations on States parties to the 
Optional Protocol arising out of that procedure, in addition to their obligations under the Covenant.’ 
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these situations, the legal opinion of a treaty body can be both validated by the court and lend 
legitimacy to existing and future treaty body opinions. It is to this phenomenon that this paper 
will now turn. 
 
4. General Comments in Domestic Courts 
There is indeed a strong argument to rely heavily on the opinions of the treaty bodies as 
interpretive tools in light of the special nature of both the treaty bodies and the nature of the 
rights their constitutive treaties are designed to protect. It must be acknowledged, however, 
that as far as the codified rules of treaty interpretation are concerned there is no mention of 
the treaty-specific monitoring mechanisms within the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. Treaty bodies had not begun to operate at the time the Vienna Convention was 
adopted thus it would have had no cause to address such mechanisms.38 This underscores the 
point that international law and human rights law, particularly, are dynamic and evolving and 
thus updates must be considered in order to maintain a coherent system. 
The following sections examine the increasing recognition of general comments by a 
selection of domestic courts. One caveat must be set forth from the outset and that is that this 
is an extremely preliminary overview of the case law derived from three distinct jurisdictions 
and is by no means comparative between them, nor exhaustive in any way. Particularly the 
following gives a perfunctory overview of general comments as introduced into the UK, 
South African and European courts. 
 
4.1 United Kingdom 
The UK is party to CERD,39 ICESCR,40 ICCPR,41 CEDAW,42 CAT,43 the CRC44 and the 
CRPD,45 thus opinions stemming from the associated treaty bodies should be acknowledged 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
38 Though the treaty bodies were functioning prior to the entry into force of the Vienna Convention in 1980. In 
its Guide to Practice on Reservations to Treaties the International Law Commission specifically recognises the 
role of treaty bodies in monitoring and determining issues related to human rights treaty interpretation, see 
Report of the International Law Commission on its 63rd session, Guide to Practice on Reservations with 
commentary, UN Doc. A/66/10/Add.1 (2011), 3.2 and 3.2.1. For an examination of this competence, see K.L. 
McCall-Smith, 'Reservations and the Determinative Function of the Human Rights Treaty Bodies' (2011) 54 
German Yearbook of International Law 521-564. 
39 The UK signed on 11 Oct. 1966 and ratified on 7 Mar. 1969. 
40 The UK signed on 16 Sept. 1968 and ratified on 20 May 1976. 
41 The UK signed on 16 Sept. 1968 and ratified on 20 May 1976. 
42 The UK signed on 22 Jul. 1981 and ratified on 7 Apr. 1986. 
43 The UK signed on 15 Mar. 1985 and ratified on 8 Dec. 1988. 
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and observed ‘in good faith’ in accordance with the Vienna Convention on the Law of 
Treaties. The trend of referencing treaty body documentation in the UK began shortly after 
the adoption of the Human Rights Act46 in 1998, yet it has taken some time for the products 
of the treaty bodies to evolve into and become accepted as more mainstream interpretive 
tools in the UK domestic legal system. Since the inception of the UK Supreme Court, 
intermittent reference to the treaty bodies has increased and this has trickled down to lower 
courts in their effort to maintain coherence with the rulings of the highest court.  
Assessment of human rights and the expansion of rights are very much shaped by 
Article 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998 in the UK, which provides: 
2 Interpretation of Convention rights. 
(1) A court or tribunal determining a question which has arisen in connection with a 
Convention right must take into account any— 
(a) judgment, decision, declaration or advisory opinion of the European Court of 
Human Rights, 
(b) opinion of the Commission given in a report adopted under Article 31 of the 
Convention, 
(c) decision of the Commission in connection with Article 26 or 27(2) of the 
Convention, or 
(d) decision of the Committee of Ministers taken under Article 46 of the Convention, 
whenever made or given, so far as, in the opinion of the court or tribunal, it is relevant 
to the proceedings in which that question has arisen.  
 
Thus, whilst it specifically outlines that UK courts must take into account the jurisprudence 
of the European Court of Human Rights and opinions of other European Convention on 
Human Rights organs, there is no direct reference to jurisprudence emanating from the UN 
treaty bodies. However, this omission has not prevented British courts from utilising treaty 
body jurisprudence in the course of interpreting human rights issues that come before them.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 The UK signed on 19 Apr. 1990 and ratified on 16 Dec. 1991. 
45 The UK signed on 26 Feb. 2009 and ratified on 7 Aug. 2009. 
46 Great Britain. Human Rights Act 1998: Elizabeth ll. Chapter 42. (1998). London: The Stationery Office, ‘An 
Act to give further effect to rights and freedoms guaranteed under the European Convention on Human Rights.’ 
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In the early months of 2014, the UK Supreme Court reflected on general comments in 
a handful of cases. For example, Kennedy v the Charity Commission47 recounted the 
evolution of the freedom of expression under Article 10 of the ECHR and how it has been 
expanded to include access to information in order to facilitate expression, particularly in the 
context of a public watch-dog.48 The Court noted that the European Court of Human Rights 
relied on General Comment No. 34 in which the Human Rights Committee49 (HRC) 
underscored that ‘the right of access to information includes a right whereby the media has 
access to information on public affairs.’50 Thus the Supreme Court ‘confidently conclude[d] 
that a right to require an unwilling public authority to disclose information can arise under 
article 10’51 because the right of access goes hand in hand with freedom of expression, as 
outlined in the HRC’s interpretation of Article 19 of the ICCPR. This does not mean that 
limitations cannot be put in place through legislation, such as those limitations established by 
the Freedom of Information Act, however it demonstrates that in the UK the domestic 
evaluation of the freedom of expression tracks the interpretation provided by the HRC in its 
general comment and therefore strengthens and refines the shared universal dimensions of the 
right.  
Examination of free movement has been a recurrent theme on which UK courts have 
looked to the treaty bodies for guidance. The HRC’s General Comment No. 27 on Freedom 
of Movement was invoked by an administrative judge in the 2010 Agyeman case.52  The 
judge pointed out that despite the fact that the ICCPR was not incorporated into domestic 
law, the freedom of movement outlined in Article 12 and expounded upon by the HRC in 
paragraphs 19 and 21 of the general comment, were rights flowing to British subjects by 
virtue of their citizenship.53 Specifically, the focus was on the deprivation of the right of a 
person to enter his own country. The dicta of the case recognised that this right was set forth 
in domestic, European and international law, though it was not an unfettered right. As 
outlined in the comment, the interference with an individual’s right to return to his country of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 Kennedy v the Charity Commission [2014] 2UKSC 20, [2014] WLR 808. 
48 Ibid., para. 186. 
49 The Human Rights Committee is the monitoring mechanism attached to the ICCPR.  
50 HRC, General Comment 34 – Article 19: Freedoms of Opinion and Expression, UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/34 
(2011), para. 18, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f34&
Lang=en (last accessed 19 November 2014). 
51 Kennedy supra note 48, para. 190. 
52 Derrick Agyeman v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Secretary of State for the 
Home Department, CO/8185/2006, [2010] EWHC 2180 (Admin) (11 Aug. 2010), para. 13. 
53 Ibid., paras 12-13. 
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residence may only be interfered with to the extent that is ‘reasonable in particular 
circumstances’.54 In this case, the Court determined that the claimant in the case had to accept 
that the difficulties with which he dealt in relation to obtaining a new British passport as a 
British citizen were justified in light of the security concerns of the age in which we live. 
Thus the general comment was once again used to refine the outer limits of the right of free 
movement by highlighting the restrictions that might legitimately be employed by the state.  
Immigration and asylum actions are possibly the most frequent cases to invoke the 
opinions of the treaty bodies in the UK, but this is largely due to the frequency of such cases 
both at the administrative and higher court levels. In 2012 the UK Supreme Court examined 
RT & KM (among others) v Secretary of State55, a series of cases revolving around asylum 
seeking refugees from Zimbabwe who not only claimed not to support the current 
Zimbabwean regime, but simply had no political views whatsoever. However, they argued 
that if returned to Zimbabwe, it would be necessary for them to lie and profess support for the 
regime in order to avoid persecution in light of the Zimbabwean authority’s view that ‘you 
are either with us or against us.’56 The Court underscored that there was ‘no support in any of 
the human rights jurisprudence for a distinction between the conscientious non-believer and 
the indifferent non-believer’57, thus the claimants should not be denied asylum simply 
because they had no political views nor should the alternative to asylum be that they could 
live a lie in their home state simply to avoid persecution.  In considering the exercise of the 
right to freedoms of thought, conscious and religion, as well as the freedom of expression, the 
Court tracked the HRC’s approach to these rights:58 
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has commented on these rights. In its 
General Comment No 22 on article 18 (30 July 1993), it said that the right to freedom 
of thought, conscience and religion in article 18.1 is “far reaching and profound” 
(para 1); the terms “belief” and “religion” are to be “broadly construed” (para 2); and 
article 18 protects “theistic, non-theistic and atheistic beliefs, as well as the right not 
to profess any religion or belief” (para 2). In its General Comment No 34 on article 19 
(12 September 2011), it said that freedom of opinion and freedom of expression are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54 HRC, General Comment 27: Freedom of Movement, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.9 (1999), para. 21, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1
%2fAdd.9&Lang=en (last accessed 18 November 2014). 
55 RT & KM (among others) v Secretary of State [2012] UKSC 38, [2012] 4 All ER 843. 
56 Ibid., para. 44. 
57 Ibid., para. 45, relying on HJ (Iran) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] 1 AC 596. 
58 Ibid., para. 33. 
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“indispensable conditions for the full development of the person. They are essential 
for any society. They constitute the foundation stone for every free and democratic 
society” (para 2). All forms of opinion are protected (para 9). At para 10, it said: “Any 
form of effort to coerce the holding or not holding of any opinion is prohibited. 
Freedom to express one’s opinion necessarily includes freedom not to express one’s 
opinion. 
 
It is clear that the Court worked to maintain a consistent interpretation of the rights involved 
by paying great deference to the rights as outlined in the HRC’s comments. By utilising the 
HRC interpretation of the right to freedom of thought, conscious and religion the Court aids 
in building a broad consensus on the expansive nature of the right.  
Continuing a long line of asylum and immigration cases specifically involving 
children, in early March of 2011 a Civil Court of Appeal judge found that five paragraphs of 
the CRC Committee’s General Comment No. 6 on Treatment of Unaccompanied and 
Separated Children Outside their Country of Origin59 were particularly relevant in DS 
(Afghanistan).60 The specificity with which the judge referred to the general comment left no 
room for questioning the importance of the comment as a tool for interpreting the validity of 
government actions. The previous month, the Supreme Court had noted in ZH (Tanzania) that 
the most relevant legislation to the question of the effects of deportation on a child was 
Article 3(1) of the CRC which establishes the ‘best interests of the child’ as the primary 
consideration for all actions involving children.61 Though a different child-related 
immigration/asylum issue was asked than in DS (Afghanistan), both courts relied on the best 
of interests of the child derived directly from the CRC and elaborated upon by the CRC 
Committee’s general comments.62 Notably, the ZH (Tanzania) opinion also cited the CRC 
Committee’s General Comment No. 6 and articulated that:63 
Exceptionally, a return to the home country may be arranged, after careful balancing 
of the child's best interests and other considerations, if the latter are rights-based and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
59 CRC Committee, General Comment No 6: Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated Children Outside 
their Country of Origin, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (2005), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fGC%2f2005%2f6&
Lang=en (last accessed 19 November 2014). 
60 DS (Afghanistan)  v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWCA Civ 305, para. 65. 
61 ZH (Tanzania) (FC) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] UKSCA, para. 23. 
62 DS (Afghanistan) (n60) para. 22; ZH (Tanzania) (FC) (n61) para. 23. 
63 ZH (Tanzania) (FC) (n61) para. 27. 
Scottish Centre for International Law Working Paper Series – Do not cite without the consent of the author 
	   15 
override best interests of the child. Such may be the case in situations in which the 
child constitutes a serious risk to the security of the State or to the society. Non-rights 
based arguments such as those relating to general migration control, cannot override 
best interests considerations.  
 
With the Supreme Court recognising the CRC Committee’s opinion, it is no wonder that a 
great ripple effect was created by the decision.  Following on from ZH (Tanzania), the 
Mansoor case, in a very similar fact pattern and relying heavily on that case, repeated the 
acceptance of CRC General Comment No. 6.64 The Mansoor decision noted that the UK 
Supreme Court has adopted ‘the approach recommended by international bodies, including 
the general comments of the rights of the child and the UNHCR guidelines, to the extent that 
a rights-based approach must be brought into being in order to justify accumulation of factors 
which could be said to outweigh the best interests of the child as a primary consideration in 
these cases.’65 
 
Thus, the progeny of ZH (Tanzania) continues to reinforce the strength of treaty body general 
comments as an integral consideration for interpreting UK law, whether as some form of 
evolving law or as an interpretive tool.  
 The use of general comments by the UK judiciary presented here demonstrates that 
these treaty body products aid in developing a more complete picture of international human 
rights obligations. It is not that British courts always utilise the chisel approach surveyed 
here. However, the selection of cases above highlights the potential for a common 
interpretation of international human rights driven by treaty body general comments.  
 
4.2 South Africa 
In 1995, a South African court opined in the Makwanyane case that both non-binding, as well 
as binding, international law ‘may be used as tools of interpretation’66 in keeping with 
Section 39 of the state’s (now former) Constitution—which is reflected in the current 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64 The Queen on the application of Mansoor v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2011] EWHC 832 
(Admin), para. 27, citing UN CRC, General Comment No 6 on the Treatment of Unaccompanied and Separated 
Children Outside their Country of Origin, UN Doc. CRC/GC/2005/6 (2005), para. 86,  
65 Ibid., para. 32. 
66 S v. Makwanyane and Another, 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) (1995 (2) SACR 1; 1995 (6) BCLR 665), para. 35. 
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Constitution, also in Article 39.67 The list of potential sources of international law provided in 
the 1995 decision included instruments produced by the HRC,68 despite the fact that the state 
had not yet ratified the ICCPR. At present, South Africa is party to CERD,69 ICCPR,70 
CEDAW,71 CAT,72 CRC,73 CRPD74 and it has signed the ICESCR75. Since the passage of the 
1996 South African Constitution76 the Constitutional Court has been particularly willing to 
utilise general comments in an effort to interpret rights stemming from the Constitution’s Bill 
of Rights (Articles 7-39).  Interestingly, the South African courts tend to invoke general 
comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ESCR Committee) 
most often, even though, as of November 2014, it has not ratified the ICESCR.   
In 2000, the Constitutional Court employed relevant international law, including a 
general comment issued by the ESCR Committee, as a tool of interpretation when 
considering the socio-economic right of access to housing in South Africa v. Grootboom.77 
The Court incorporated paragraph 10 of General Comment No. 3 on The Nature of States 
Parties’ Obligations into the opinion verbatim to establish that the ‘minimum core obligation’ 
is necessary to determine whether a state was in violation of its obligations under the 
ICESCR, as outlined by the ESCR Committee. The minimum core obligation was eventually 
determined to be outwith the scope of the case,78 however, the dicta proved useful in 
subsequent examinations of alleged violations of economic and social rights. Many human 
rights observers took issue with the Court for its failure to employ a ‘minimum essential 
level’ of an economic, social and cultural right,79 as outlined by the ESCR Committee in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 Article 39, para. 1, of the current Constitution of the Republic of South Africa reads as follows: ‘When 
interpreting the Bill of Rights, a court, tribunal or forum—;(b) must consider international law; and (c) may 
consider foreign law.’ 
68 Ibid., para. 35. 
69 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
70 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
71 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 15 Dec. 1995. 
72 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 10 Dec. 1998. 
73 South Africa signed on 29 Jan. 1993 and ratified on 16 Jun. 1995. 
74 South Africa signed on 30 Mar. 2007 and ratified on 30 Nov. 2007. 
75 South Africa signed on 3 Oct. 1994. 
76 Adopted on 18 Dec. 1996 and became effective on 4 Feb. 1997. 
77 South Africa v. Grootboom, 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (4 Oct. 2000). 
78 ‘There may be cases where it may be possible and appropriate to have regard to the content of a minimum 
core obligation to determine whether the measures taken by the State are reasonable. However, even if it were 
appropriate to do so, it could not be done unless sufficient information is placed before a Court to enable it to 
determine the minimum core in any given context. In this case, we do not have sufficient information to 
determine what would comprise the minimum core obligation in the context of our Constitution. It is not in any 
event necessary to decide whether it is appropriate for a Court to determine in the first instance the minimum 
core content of a right.’ Ibid., 66.  
79 For example, D. Davis, ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional Court after 
Ten Years’ (2004) 5 ESR Review 3-7; Institute for Democracy in Africa (IDASA), ‘The Women’s Budget’, 
Scottish Centre for International Law Working Paper Series – Do not cite without the consent of the author 
	   17 
General Comment No. 3.80 Effectively the opinion severed an essential component of the 
realisation of economic and social rights identified by the ESCR Committee, thereby 
inhibiting the development of a universal interpretation of the right to adequate housing.81 
The Court opted for a test of reasonable legislative (and other) measures within its available 
resources to progressively realise the right to housing. Whilst in many ways Grootboom was 
a major victory in the fight to have economic, social and cultural rights recognized and 
substantiated in a court of law, it is a sad note that eight years after Irene Grootboom’s 
‘victory’, she died in a shack in Cape Town without any indicia of her right to housing 
having been fulfilled. Without employing the ‘minimum essential level’ outlined by the 
ESCR Committee, the realisation of the right was not achieved.  
The ESCR Committee has issued two general comments on the right to adequate 
housing and both have been employed by the Constitutional Court in subsequent efforts to 
flesh out the duties imposed on the state by Article 26 of its Constitution, particularly in 
relation to displaced individuals. Article 26(1) provides that ‘[e]veryone has the right to have 
access to adequate housing.’ The South African Constitutional right to ‘access’ adequate 
housing is somewhat different than the right as introduced by ICESCR Article 11(1). General 
Comment No. 7, The Right to Adequate Housing,82 was utilised by the Constitutional Court 
in the 2009 Joe Slovo Community83 forced evictions case. It drew upon the treaty body’s 
interpretation of appropriate measures to establish the obligation of the state to provide 
housing for those persons subject to a legitimate forced eviction:84     
[E]victions should not result in people being rendered homeless. And where the 
people affected by the eviction are unable to provide for themselves, the [government] 
must take all appropriate measures, to the maximum of its available resources, to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Budget Brief No. 111, (October 2002),  http://oppenheimer.mcgill.ca/IMG/pdf/10-
09_Fondements_Pleniere_Grootboom.pdf  (last accessed 13 November 2014). 
80 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 3: The nature of States parties' obligations, U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, 
annex III at 86 (1991) para. 10. 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TiBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=9&DocTypeID=11 
(accessed 13 Nov. 2014). 
81 It must be acknowledged, also, that the South African right is phrased ‘right to have access to adequate 
housing’ (emphasis added) whilst the international obligation is the ‘right to adequate housing’ which some 
argue are two different concepts.  
82 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 7:  The right to adequate housing  
(art. 11 (1) of the Covenant):  Forced evictions, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I), paras 7, 16, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCESCR%2fGEC%2f
6430&Lang=en (last accessed 20 November 2014). 
83 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v. Thubelisha Homes and Others (CCT 22/08) (2009). 
84 Ibid., para. 32. 
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ensure that adequate alternative housing, resettlement or access to productive land, as 
the case may be, is available.  
 
Comment No. 7 was also used to define the duty of the government, including 
procedural protections, when relocating people under South Africa’s PIE85 policy.86 
Previously, in Mpange v. Sithole,87 the Court had relied upon the ESCR Committee’s 1991 
General Comment No. 4 on the Right to Adequate Housing88 to examine the duties imposed 
on the state by Article 26 of its Constitution with respect to the right to adequate housing.89 In 
particular, the Mpange Court noted the interrelatedness of adequate housing and other 
fundamental rights, such as human dignity, as outlined by the ICESCR Committee.90 
Underscoring the relationship to human dignity is particularly important in light of the 
Constitutional Court’s recognition of human dignity as the ‘central value of the objective 
normative value system establish by the Constitution.’91 It also emphasized the ESCR 
Committee’s stress on the need for effective domestic legal remedies in order to comply with 
ICESCR obligations.92 These references to general comments are a step forward, although 
the South Africa experience highlights that domestic use of these soft law instruments does 
not always equate to the successful implementation of a universal minimum standard of 
human rights.  
More recently, in April 2011, the Constitutional Court used HRC General Comment 
No. 393 and ESCR Committee General Comment No. 1394 to frame the importance of and 
basic right to education and to interpret a private party’s obligation to not infringe the right of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
85 Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act (PIE), Act 19 of 1998. 
86 Residents of Joe Slovo Community, Western Cape v supra note 84, paras 36-37. 
87 Mpange and Others v. Sithole (07/1063) [2007] ZAGPHC 201 (22 Jun. 2007). 
88 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 4: The right to adequate housing (art. 11 (1) of the Covenant), UN 
Doc. E/1992/23 (1991), para. 8, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCESCR%2fGEC%2f
4759&Lang=en (last accessed 17 November 2014). 
89 Mpange (n87) para. 51. 
90 Ibid., para. 51. 
91 Ibid., para. 53. On this point see A. Chaskalson, ‘Human Dignity as a Foundational Value of our 
Constitutional Order’ (2000) 16 South African Journal of Human Rights 193-206. 
92 Mpagne (n87) para. 52. 
93 HRC, General Comment No. 3, Article 2 Implementation at the National Level, Doc HRI/GEN/1/Rev.1 at 4 
(1994), 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=INT%2fCCPR%2fGEC%2f6
632&Lang=en (last accessed 15 November 2014). 
94 ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13, The Right to Education, UN Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999). 
Scottish Centre for International Law Working Paper Series – Do not cite without the consent of the author 
	   19 
education under the Bill of Rights. In Juma Musjid Primary School95 the Court established 
that the Member of the Executive Council for Education for KwaZulu-Natal, a representative 
of the government, failed to comply with the positive obligation to ‘respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil’96 the right to a basic education despite its recognised status as an empowerment 
right and ‘the primary vehicle by which economically and socially marginalized adults and 
children can lift themselves out of poverty and obtain the means to participate fully in their 
communities.’97  In this instance, the use of the treaty bodies’ interpretations helped 
consolidate the international minimum standards required to fulfil the right to education.  
It is not only the South African Constitutional Court that has relied upon general 
comments in pursuit of abiding by Article 39 of the state’s Constitution. In 2008, the High 
Court of South Africa relied upon ESCR Committee General Comment No. 15 on The Right 
to Water98 - arts. 11 and 12 - to determine that ‘the State is obliged to provide free basic 
water to the poor’99 despite there being no express right to water under international or South 
African law.100 This case exemplified the Court’s readiness to recognise the interrelatedness 
and indivisibility of human rights and the fact that gaps related to the realisation of rights 
must often be filled using all available tools of interpretation. 
The courts of South Africa have firmly established the outputs of the treaty bodies as 
indispensable sources of law. Though the use of general comments has not consistently 
represented a step forward in the universal standard of certain rights as addressed by the 
South African courts, progress can definitely be charted. As the courts tease out the true 
meaning of the protections provided in the South Africa Bill of Rights, the interpretive 
guidance provided by general comments, and other treaty body jurisprudence, will continue 
to be an unparalleled tool.  
 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
95 Juma Musjid Primary School & Others v. Essay N.O. and Others (CCT 29/10) [2011] ZACC 13 (11 April 
2011). 
96 Ibid., para. 45. 
97 Ibid., para. 41, quoting the ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 13, UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 
I). 
98 UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. I). 
99 S v Mazibuko (A1246/2006) [2008] ZAGPHC 106 (18 April 2008), paras. 36-37, see specifically para. 40. 
100 Ibid., para. 45. The right to water, as indicated in General Comment No. 15, is derived from Article 11 of the 
ICESCR, which enunciates a non-exhaustive list of rights that must be insured in order to uphold the right to an 
adequate standard of living. See ESCR Committee, General Comment No. 15: The right to water (arts. 11 and 
12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), UN Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (Vol. 
I), paras 2-6, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=E%2fC.12%2f2002%2f11&
Lang=en (last accessed 20 November 2014). 
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4.3 Europe as a supranational jurisdiction 
European courts, including the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) were the quickest to consider treaty body 
jurisprudence as supporting sources in the course of evaluating complaints involving human 
rights issues. This swift uptake can be attributed to the prominence of the European 
Convention on Human Rights101 (ECHR), which has guided European courts since 1950. 
Both the Council of Europe system and the European Union maintain human rights as a 
primary policy objective. Therefore it is unsurprising that these systems, supporting the 
development of universal human rights standards, have often utilised the soft law 
promulgated by the treaty bodies in their efforts to normalise the interpretation of rights.   
 In the 2010 Bressol case,102 the CJEU enunciated its understanding that all Member 
States of the EU103 were bound to both the ICCPR and the ICESCR:104 
The Court has held that the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR) is one of the international instruments for the protection of human rights of 
which it takes account in applying the general principles of Community law. It seems 
to me that the same should hold good for the ICESCR which, like the ICCPR, binds 
each individual Member State.  
 
The case concerned the constitutionality of a decree regulating the number of students 
in certain programmes of higher education for the first two years.105 The referring Belgian 
court essentially asked the CJEU to make a determination as to whether EU legislation 
precluded the type of decree and to explain the nature of Member States’ rights under 
ICESCR Article 13(2)(c). The Court confirmed as relevant legislation articles of the ICESCR 
(Articles 2(2) and 13(2)(c)) dealing with the right to education without any form of 
discrimination and relied upon General Comment No. 13106 to articulate that the prohibition 
against discrimination was ‘subject to neither progressive realisation nor the availability of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
101 European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR). 4 Nov. 1950, 
ETS No. 005, 213 UNTS 221, as amended by Protocol Nos. 11 (ETS No. 155) and 14 (CETS No. 194), entry 
into force 1 Jun. 2010. 
102 Bressol and Others v. Gouvernement de la Commuauté Française(of Belgium), (Case C-73/08) [2010] 
3.C.M.L.R. 20 (ECJ-GC), 13 Apr. 2010. 
103 All EU Member States are individual parties to both Covenants. 
104 Bressol (n102) para. AG136, footnotes omitted. 
105 Ibid., para. 2. 
106 ESCR Committee, General Comment No 13 (n94). 
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resources; it applies fully and immediately to all aspects of education and encompasses all 
internationally prohibited grounds of discrimination.’107 Though the CJEU has far less call to 
refer to the treaty bodies, the above quoted passage leaves no room for questioning whether 
these treaties must be acknowledged by the EU Member States, which in turn, could bring 
general comments into use as a regular interpretive tool.  
 As the primary court of review human rights violations, the ECtHR has had many 
occasions to refer to the opinion of various treaty bodies. The cases discussed here represent 
a sampling of those where a general comment was invoked as an interpretive tool. In 2014, 
the ECtHR applied HRC General Comment No. 20, in concert with other international law, in 
Marguš v Croatia108 to assess the issue of the right not to be tried for the same charges and 
the right to a fair trial in light of an amnesty granted to the claimant. Following General 
Comment No. 20, the ECtHR recognised that, though some States have granted amnesties for 
acts of torture, such amnesties violate the duty of states under the ICCPR to investigate and 
prevent acts prohibited by ICCPR Article 7. Thus in this instance, the ECtHR utilised the 
general comment to reinforce the need to limit the use of amnesties in order to ensure justice 
for the victims of torture or other prohibited treatment. Marguš represents one of a growing 
line of cases focused on refining the prohibition against torture and the multifarious ways in 
which the breach of the right might be manifested.   
The legal qualification of threats as torture was examined by the ECtHR in 2010. As 
part of it’s evaluation, the Court referenced a 2001 report by the UN Special Rapporteur for 
the Commission on Human Rights where he reminded governments the prohibition of torture 
related also to acts that cause mental suffering, including intimidation and threats as pointed 
out in the HRC General Comment No. 20.  It also referenced HRC General Comment No. 7  
(which was replaced by No. 20) to confirm the principle of the importance of effective 
protection and remedy for victims of torture or ill-treatment, including the inadmissibility of 
statements or confessions obtained by torture or other prohibited treatment.   The impact of 
General Comment Nos. 7 and 20 continue to resonate in cases throughout both the Council of 
Europe and European Union systems.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Bressol (n103) para. 138. The court ultimately concluded that the ICESCR articles would only be applicable, 
however, if the decree at issue was ruled compatible with the TFEU. See Order, para. 2. 
108 Margus v Croatia, ECtHR (GC) [2014] ECHR 523.  
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In Baka v. Hungary,109 the ECtHR sat in a unique position as it heard an application 
by one of its former members relating to the independence of the judiciary. The Court relied 
heavily on HRC General Comment No. 32 on the Right to equality before courts and 
tribunals and to a fair trial to outline the international guidance on what ICCPR Article 14 
required in the context of independence of the judiciary and protecting judges from political 
influence.110 The ECtHR ultimately found that Baka’s ECHR Article 10 rights had been 
violated and in doing so confirmed an international standard for the independence of the 
judiciary.  
The Hirst111 judgment in 2005 referred to HRC General Comment No. 25(57)112 
which detailed the requirement that states provide detailed information on any legislation that 
was the basis of suspending the right to vote.113 The case involved prisoner voting rights in 
the UK and the Court ultimately held that the UK was in violation of ECHR Protocol No. 1, 
Article 3 due to the broad blanket ban depriving prisoners of the right to vote. In another 
2005 case, Öcalan v. Turkey, the ECtHR recognised the findings of the HRC in Reid v. 
Jamaica, which were based on its General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life)114, as 
‘international developments concerning the death penalty.’115 Thus the Court noted the 
changing views of the international community at large as set forth by the HRC general 
comment. 
A distinguishing feature of the ECtHR is its ability to stay on top of the large amount 
of information coming out of the treaty bodies and to employ it without delay. One reason for 
this may be the number of judges that sit on the ECtHR that formerly served as members of a 
treaty body.116 It could also be the increasing cross-fertilisation of information across 
international human rights mechanisms. Whatever the reason, the ECtHR has demonstrated a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
109 Baka v. Hungary (Chamber) [2014] ECHR 528. 
110 HRC, General Comment No. 32: Article 14: Right to equality before courts and tribunals and to a fair trial, 
UN Doc. CCPR/C/GC/32 (2007), paras 19-21, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2fGC%2f32&
Lang=en (last accessed 20 November 2014). 
111 Hirst v. United Kingdom, ECtHR (GC), No. 74025/01, judgment 6 Oct. 2005, para. 27. 
112 Participation in Public Affairs and the Right to Vote, UN Doc. CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.7 
113 Hirst (n111) para. 27. 
114 HRC, General Comment No. 6: Article 6 (Right to Life),30 April 1982,  
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/TBSearch.aspx?Lang=en&TreatyID=8&DocTypeID=11 
(last accessed 19 November 2014). 
115 Öcalan v. Turkey, ECtHR (GC), No. 46221/99, judgment 12 May 2005, para. 60. 
116  Judge Boštjan Zupančič was a member of the CAT Committee (1995-98); Judge Linos-Alexandre Sicilianos 
was a member of the CERD Committee (2002-09); Judge Helen Keller was a member of the HRC (2008-11); 
Judge  Iulia Antoanella Motoc was a member of the HRC (2006-13). 
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deft capacity to engage the jurisprudence of the treaty bodies in its navigation of international 
human rights standards.  
The 2007 General Comment No. 10 of the CRC Committee and the 2008 General 
Comment No. 2 of the CAT Committee were used by the Court in the November 2008 Salduz 
v. Turkey117 judgment to elaborate on the relevant law concerning legal assistance to minors 
in police custody. It expressly incorporated two paragraphs of the CRC Committee 
comment118 and one from the CAT comment119 to interpret the extent of Turkey’s obligation 
to provide assistance, legal or otherwise, in cases involving juveniles and the general right of 
access to a lawyer while in police custody. Regarding general comments as interpretive tools, 
Salduz is particularly interesting in that it used two comments that were issued after the 
commencement of the case which highlights the evolving nature of the tools that are essential 
to rights protection.   
The use of general comments quite often reflects the interrelatedness and indivisibility 
of human rights as recognised in a broad range of treaties. HRC General Comment No. 29: 
States of Emergency (Article 4)120 was used in 2009 to assist in determining the legal 
standard as to when a legitimate derogation to the ECHR could be claimed. The applicants in 
the case alleged unlawful detention, which was countered by the UK with an argument that it 
was derogating (as outlined in the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001) from certain 
ECHR obligations. Primary questions in the cases leading to the ECtHR hearing were the 
actual existence of a valid ‘public emergency’ and the duration of the derogation to Article 5 
of the ECHR. As noted in the Comment No. 29, ‘[m]easures derogating from the provisions 
of the Covenant must be of an exceptional and temporary nature.’121 The Court ultimately 
held that despite there being a public emergency worthy of derogation and that the derogation 
was not of an unreasonable duration in keeping with accepted law, including General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 (ECtHR) App. 36391/02, 27 Nov. 2008. 
118 CRC Committee, General Comment No. 10: Children’s rights in juvenile justice, UN Doc. CRC/C/GC/10 
(2007), paras 49, 52, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CRC%2fC%2fGC%2f10&L
ang=en (last accessed 19 November 2014). 
119 CAT Committee, General Comment No. 2 : Implementation of article 2 by States parties, UN Doc. 
CAT/C/GC/2 (2008), para.13, 
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CAT%2fC%2fGC%2f2&La
ng=en (last accessed 20 November 2014). 
120 HRC, General Comment No 29: State of Emergency (article 4), UN CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add.11 
(2001),  
http://tbinternet.ohchr.org/_layouts/treatybodyexternal/Download.aspx?symbolno=CCPR%2fC%2f21%2fRev.1
%2fAdd.11&Lang=en (last accessed 19 November 2014). 
121 Case of A and Others v. United Kingdom, App. 3455/05, 19 Feb. 2009, citing HRC General Comment 29, 
para. 2. 
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Comment No. 29, the ‘derogation measures were disproportionate in that they discriminated 
unjustifiably between nationals and non-nationals.’122 Thus, mixing and matching the various 
international obligations and standards was necessary to get to the heart of the breach of the 
obligation. 
The approach of the ECtHR in referencing a wide range of treaty body jurisprudence, 
as demonstrated in Neulinger,  reinforces the common mantra that a human rights convention 
‘cannot be interpreted in a vacuum but must be interpreted in harmony with the general 
principles of international law.’123 The Neulinger decision relied upon HRC General 
Comments Nos. 17 and 19, among several other international documents to tease out the 
meaning of the ‘best interests of the child’124 and the decision has resonated across many 
European states. The position of the ECtHR, as well as other supranational human rights 
courts, is unique in the potential for its decisions, and the reasoning articulated therein, to 
influence the states within it regulatory system. Giving pride of place to treaty body 
instruments as means of determining human rights standards at the European level 
strengthens the ‘soft’ nature of this jurisprudence and underscores its value as an interpretive 
tool.  
 
5. Conclusion 
It is clear that the general comments of the human rights treaty bodies are being referenced in 
judicial opinions at the domestic and supranational level. Whether introduced by zealous 
human rights defenders, NGO amicus briefs or the judges themselves, it cannot be denied 
that the interpretations of human rights conventions by the treaty bodies are gaining traction 
in domestic courts.  What is less clear is the legal value that attaches to the comments in light 
of this phenomenon. This is particularly true when the comments are employed to achieve 
different aims than originally intended by the treaty body or where a court opts not to adopt 
the approach taken by the treaty body issuing the comment.  
In some instances the use of general comments is norm-filling and aids in refining the 
universal interpretation of human rights. In others, a court’s failure to follow the reasoning of 
the treaty body suggests that the right is subject to alternative or selective interpretations and 
may be shattered by the reluctance of domestic judiciaries to follow the international 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid., para. 181,190. 
123 Neulinger v Switzerland (2010) 28 BHRC 706, para. 131. 
124 Ibid., paras 49-56. 
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interpretation. In those instances where the highest courts in a jurisdiction have opted use 
general comments to construe a state’s obligations, it can be certain that lower courts will 
follow suit. Does this indicate broadening of the available interpretive tools or should these 
examples be treated as mere throw-away observations? The evolution of the international 
human rights system has occurred in many ways that were not conceived at its inception in 
1948. The impact of general comments must be included in this observation and only time 
will reveal the true interpretive power of this form of treaty body jurisprudence.  
 
